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courts hold the contrary where, as here, the benefit sought to be enforced
is the liability on a fidelity bond executed by the dishonest agent.8
It would seem that the question of whether an insured shall be permitted
to recover in this latter situation should turn on a question of contract
rather than on the technical doctrine of imputed notice.9 Probably the
parties had no "actual intention" with respect to the matter in issue at
the time the contract was executed. Where such ambiguity of intent exists,
the courts of necessity must determine what the parties would have intended
had the specific question been presented at the time;' 0 and it would seem
fair to assume that, if it had been considered when the bond was issued, the
parties would have intended that the bond cover the matter.
The federal court in the present case, however, was required" to follow
Pennsylvania law' 2 which denies recovery to the principal because of the
doctrine of imputed notice. It is submitted that the better rule is in
accord with the majority view which permits a recovery on the bond. 13
P. H. A.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORIANCE AND INJUNCTION-INEXACT AND DISCRE-
TIONARY OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTING PARTiEs-[Federal].-Defendant in-
vented and patented a unique type of military tank. By contract, plaintiff
became the exclusive agent of defendant for the sale and manufacture of
8. American Surety Co. v. Pauly (1898) 170 U. S. 133; Maryland Cas-
ualty Co. v. Tulsa Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. (1936) 83 F. (2d) 14, 105
A. L. R. 529; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gate City Nat'l Bank (1895) 97 Ga.
634, 25 S. E. 392, 33 L. R. A. 821, 54 Am. St. Rep. 440.
9. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gate City Nat'l Bank (1895) 97 Ga.
634, 25 S. E. 392, 393, 33 L. R. A. 821, 54 Am. St. Rep. 440, Lumpkin, J.,
said, "* * * we cannot think that the parties to this contract contemplated
that the bank would be bound to act upon mere constructive notice of Red-
wine's [the agent] shortcomings. The 'knowledge' referred to meant actual
knowledge."
10. Reed v. Insurance Co. (1877) 95 U. S. 23; Higgins v. California
Petroleum & Asphalt Co. (1898) 120 Cal. 629, 52 Pac. 1080; Hamill & Co.
v. Woods (1895) 95 Iowa 246, 62 N. W. 735. See Corbin, Contracts (16th
ed. 1924) 425, sec. 354.
11. Under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 114
A. L. R. 1487. The court said, per Maris, J.: "The mere fact that the
decision in Gordon v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, would seem to us
somewhat out of line with the general trend of the authorities both in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere cannot, under the case of Erie R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins, above cited, be of more than academic interest to this court." First
Nat'l Bank of Weatherly v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1939)
105 F. (2d) 339, 341.
12. Gordon v. Continental Casualty Co. (1935) 319 Pa. 555, 181 At. 574,
104 A. L. R. 1238.
13. Generally, where a contractual ambiguity arises in the case of fidelity
or guarantee contracts, the courts construe them strictly against the in-
surer, and such surety's obligation is not considered to be strictissimi juris.
Galveston Causeway Construction Co. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. (D. C.
S. D. Tex. 1922) 284 Fed. 137; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Northern Granite
& Stone Co. (1919) 100 Ohio 373, 126 N. E. 405, 12 A. L. R. 378. See Note
(1921) 12 A. L. R. 382, where many authorities are collected.
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the tank and for the sale of rights for its manufacture by others. On pay-
ment of $5,000, plaintiff was to receive from defendant the plans of the
tank and to begin selling manufacturing licenses to foreign countries.
Licenses were to sell at a minimum of $50,000, and an additional charge
for each country was to be determined by plaintiff and defendant, who were
to divide the license fees equally. Before a license could be sold to a par-
ticular country, moreover, both parties had to agree that the sale was
"practical." Plaintiff paid the $5,000 but defendant refused to deliver the
plans. Plaintiff then brought a bill for specific performance and for an
injunction to prevent defendant from appointing any other agent. Held,
that the complicated and uncertain nature of plaintiff's obligations pre-
vented the granting of an injunction, just as the complicated and uncertain
nature of defendant's obligations prevented the granting of specific per-
formance.,
Equitable relief has generally been granted in cases involving contracts
for the sale of unique chattels, where damages would be inadequate.2 When
the terms of a contract, however, are so uncertain as to make difficult the
framing and supervision of the decree, equity has refused to grant specific
performance.3 On the other hand, injunctive decrees, negative and prohi-
bitory in function, require comparatively little judiciary supervision for
enforcement in most personal service contract cases. 4 Such injunctions
seem never to have been refused before in personal service contracts, on
the ground that the plaintiff has obligations to the defendant which are
inexact and discretionary. 5
It was orthodox, then, to refuse to enforce specifically this contract which
required the parties to agree on such matters of opinion as to which coun-
tries to sell licenses, and how much to charge. Frequent contempt proceed-
ings might have resulted from honest differences of opinion, compelling
the court to decide, after extensive inquiry what, under the contract, would
be reasonable conduct for the defendant.
In refusing an injunction, the court seems not to have considered that
1. Bethlehem Engineering Export Co. v. Christie (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 105
F. (2d) 933.
2. 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 3954, sec. 1419, and cases there
cited, n. 6; Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 361, comment e.
3. 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 3986, sec. 1424, and cases there
cited, n. 1; Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 370, comment b. But see
Walsh, Equity (1930) 328, sec. 65; Mayor of Wolverhampton v. Emmons
(1901) 1. K. B. 515; Storer v. Great Western Ry. (1842) 2 Y. & C. C. C.
48, 63 Eng. Rep. 21.
4. "There is no inherent difficulty, however, in the enforcement of an
injunction which goes no farther than to prohibit entering into other em-
ployment." 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 4049, sec. 1450.
5. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union Button-Hole & Embroidery Co.
(C. C. D. Mass. 1873) Fed. Cas. No. 12,904 (exclusive agency for sale of
patented sewing machines) ; Brush-Swan Electric Light Co. v. Brush Electric
Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1890) 41 Fed. 163 (exclusive agency for sale of
patented generating equipment). These cases are cited in the principal case
as the only two cases directly in point, contra to the court's decision, and
poorly reasoned.
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it might order the defendant to remain completely inactive.0 Instead, the
court reasoned thus: "But the continuance of such an injunction would
depend upon continuance of the defendants' obligation to the plaintiff; and
the continuance of that obligation would in turn depend upon the plaintiff's
continued performnance of its duties under the contract. These are as un-
certain as the defendants' * * *.-7 This language seems to indicate that
the court based its decision on some phase of the doctrine of "lack of mu-
tuality." If so, it was not on the discredited doctrine of "lack of mutuality
of remedy" s but on what some writers have termed "lack of mutuality of
performance."9 Regardless of what the doctrine be called, the court here
indicated that it would grant an injunction only if it could be assured that
the plaintiff would perform his duties under the contract.'0 Since the plain-
tiff's duties were so uncertain, the court felt that, should an injunction be
granted, it would be difficult to know if the plaintiff were performing.
Assuming, as it did for argument's sake, the existence of a contract
enforceable at law, the court correctly found it not specifically enforceable
in equity. It is submitted, however, that the court could as readily have
denied relief because mutuality of obligation in the purported contract was
altogether lacking.
T. B.
INSURANCE-PARTIAL DESTRUCTION OF INSURED PREMISES-EFFECT OF A
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE UPON LIABILITY OF INSURER-[Wisconsin].-An in-
sured house was damaged to the extent of fifty per cent of its original
value; and thereafter, in accordance with a municipal ordinance, it was
ordered razed. In an action upon the fire insurance policy, held, that the
insurer was liable for the total value of the house.1
This case restates the general rule that, where a building is partially
destroyed and, pursuant to a fire ordinance, is either ordered completely
6. Such an injunction would not have benefitted the plaintiff; it would
have merely penalized the defendant. Such injunctions are not favored
in equity. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1890) 42 Fed. 198, 199, 7 L. R. A. 381, 383; Rice v. D'Arville (1895) 162
Mass. 559, 561, 39 N. E. 180, 181; Tribune Ass'n v. Simonds (N. J. Eq.
1918) 104 Atl. 386, 389; Arena Athletic Club v. McPartland (1899) 41 App.
Div. 352, 353, 58 N. Y. S. 477, 478; 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937)
4051, sec. 1450.
7. Bethlehem Engineering Export Co. v. Christie (C. C. A. 2, 1939)
933, 935.
8. See McClintock, Equity (1936) 116, sec. 66. Earlier in its opinion
the court disclaimed any considerations of "mutuality", but whether it
meant lack of mutuality of obligation or of remedy does not clearly appear.
9. Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance (1903) 3 Col. L. Rev. 1, 8;
McClintock, Equity (1936) 116, sec. 66.
10. See Cook, The Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule
(1927) 36 Yale L. J. 897, 904; Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 373,
where a formal label for this "equity" is avoided but the process for dis-
covering it is described.
1. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Murry (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 105 F. (2d)
212.
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